ears with equal devotion. Follow the Middle Way as Tao did in his Middle Kingdom. Or "straight down the middle," as golfer Bing Crosby used to croon. His other golf song was "The Wearing of the Green," but such digressions run counter to my straight, plow-on-ahead advice. I've just smoked a cigarette branded Cleopatra, but that's none of your beeswax neither, and strictly between me and my Egyptian placements sponsor.
So, shun deviations and avoid life's bunkers lurking left and right. Our current presidential candidates excel in this craftiness, being both pro-Nafta and anti-Nafta as the local polls dictate. Yet, by one of those many quirks of natural language, politicians seeking "compromises" often find their reputations "compromised."
In pondering the attributes that make for good, wellshod scientists, and in particular, good systems designers and developers, an intuitive sense of balance looms large. We work from incomplete specifications and ill-defined, IT functional? There are few finer discussions of these challenges than Jim Waldo's 2004 essay, "On System Waldo pondered anew why things were getting worse. After reviewing the "design" process, and reminding us of the term's ambiguity (systems may exhibit design without having been designed), he traces the environmental causes for this decline, such as intellectual property constraints and poor training. There's always some element of "usthem" scapegoating when things go wrong: echoes of Hardy wrongly blaming Laurel, which always niggles me because "Another fine mess you've gotten us into, Stan" easily triggers my guilty self-defensive reactions. (Why are there so few Stans around, whether Stanleys or Stanislauses?)
Waldo, unlike the whinging Hardy, suggests real remedies of the agile and open persuasions to reduce the mess, but without excluding the occasions when heavy and closed subterfuge is needed. Interestingly, he stresses the need for courage at the grass-roots, nonmanagerial level-for example, in the ways masters should teach their crafts and delegate to apprentices. At the same time, Waldo urges solutions that don't require impractical major revolutions in the managerial infrastructure. You need to work around existing organizational hazards. Thus, we return to my opening theme of balancing between opposites. This is not the same as cowardly (and possibly painfully) sitting on fences. We envisage more a hidden door or two in the fence accessible to the qualified gnostic who is free to roam unhindered, admiring the views in many fields.
We face the apparent paradox that it's possible and useful to honestly hold mutually contradictory beliefs simultaneously. The Greek dilemma for two such opposing beliefs can be extended to trilemma for three, and on to n-lemma, but we strongly recommend small positive integral values for n. We can exclude Quineans whose heads are buzzing with propositions and quoted "propositions" that mean their opposites: that way madness lies, and a possible collapse of meaningful meanings. What I have in mind (to coin a phrase!) is hinted at by the idiom "playing both sides down the middle." There are plausible beliefs, which we can poshly call hypotheses, of the type Karl Popper called "falsifiable." Indeed, he used falsifiability to distinguish scientific hypotheses from those that may well be meaningful but somehow fall outside the nitprobing methods of science. Trying to ignore the sniff of circularity (which is all around us on such occasions), we seek ways of distinguishing between beliefs that require endless individual observational verifications to sustain them and beliefs that, at least conceptually, could admit to a sudden single deflating counter-example (see this column, "Some Swans are Black," July/August 2007).
Precision in wording one's beliefs is paramount, of course, when moving between formal and informal statements. Did Dijkstra consider all GOTOs harmful 3 As far as I could check with HyperLint, every eventuality seems to be covered without a single exception throw needed. Readers reading this on April 1 are warned that I'm aware that I seem to be presenting a discredited, deterministic, discretely countable universe. Not necessarily. The symbols 0, 1, and googol are not to be interpreted by human C++ standards. God gave us the integers, and God can override the integers.
Dijkstra, "spreading his bets," suggests another helpful idiom, leading to game theory and risk analysis. For here we reach real life as it is lived by the vast majority of my readers. A moment of truth approaches, demanding honest introspection. If your beliefs have no discernible impact on your behavior, can we really believe the sincerity of your belief-claims? Russell was fond of testing someone's belief that it was going to rain. Did that someone stay indoors or venture out without her brolly? Sooner or later, balances must be balanced, weights weighed, decisions made, bets placed, acts enacted. But how to pick the best (or least-worst) hypothesis?
Occam's razor just shaves off a few baby-hairs from rival hypotheses. Solomon's sword divides the whole baby, offering each mother an evenly balanced slice. But hurry before someone empties the baby with the bathwater. (Philosophers love these confusing homely parables.) We nod knowingly over the Biblical tale, admiring Solomon's wisdom in identifying the biological mother. Don Watson applies modern jurisprudence to the case with telling results ("Solomon Reversed on Appeal") 5 , while I'm inclined to ponder the outcome if the mothers had been equally versed in game theory brinkmanship. Calling them Mrs. A and Mrs. B, we must assume that each sincerely believes in her claimed maternal relationship. Each must weigh the credibility of Solomon's threat to cleave the babe in twain. And each must assign values to the possible outcomes: one mother winning full custody or neither; both gaining gruesome half-custody, which can be taken as at least denying the rival mother custody. Twisting the aphorism, "It's not enough to succeed, others must fail," we reach this: "It's not so bad losing as long as others do not win." Jim Waldo's courage is in great demand.
In our own fair trade, extreme, opinionated, backbiting positions are taken on the most fundamental issues, such as "What is or are data, and how should it or they be processed?" As that curmudgeon's curmudgeon, Arthur Schopenhauer, meant to say, "Opinions are like bums, everybody's got one." It's hard, not to say pointless, to formalize this balance of extremes. But Booles rush in. 7 Extending my great, grand (meaning famously renowned) Great-Grand-Uncle George's binary logic, we have the SKB-quasi-continuous-ternary system with +N (true), -N (false), iN (meaningless). Here, N is an integer >= 0 intended, somehow, to indicate plausibility or evidential-support; i is either
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curmudgeon of the square roots of minus 1. Your choice, if you think it matters. The aim is to "quantify" propositions over an integral Gaussian lattice (q.g.).
T(P) = (x, y) = x + iy, the truth-value of P, is meant to indicate some mix of truth, falsehood, and meaninglessness. With y = 0 (giving T(P) real values), we are close to traditional binary Booleans but with x > 0 meaning true, x < 0 meaning false, and with the added nuance that x1 > x2 > 0 means that x1 is more true than the true x2. Similarly 0 > x1 > x2 means that x2 is falser than the false x1. Reassuringly, all truths, however small, are truer than all falsehoods, however small! For x = 0, y !=0, we conveniently locate all truly meaningless propositions on the y-axis. I'm working on a meaningful metric for meaningless, one that meets our daily intuition that some propositions are clearly dafter than others. Thus, y1 > y2 means y1 is more meaningless than y2. The rules for logical implication must also be carefully extended beyond the traditional (p -> q) = (!p v q). We must retain the old truth tables for real values of T(P), so that true never implies false, but I've never been happy with false implies true or false. We would certainly hope to prevent "daft" implying anything "dafter," while "daft" can safely imply "less daft." Formally, T(0, y1) -> T(0, y2) for all y1 >= y2 > 0. But T(0, y1) !-> T(0, y2) for all y2 >= y1 > 0. I call this the Limiting Insanity Clause in honor of the Marx Brothers.
The singularity at the origin T(P) = (0, 0) is reserved for genuine, meaningful don't-knows. Don't push me on this. Epistemologist Donald Rumsfeld has not returned my calls. Some think they know that the truths or falsehoods of Goldberg's conjecture (P = NP) are presently unknown but in essence knowable. That is, one day, before the stars lose their glory, 8 we'll nail them as true or false. Others think they may be in essence undecidable a la Goedel. One thing is certain. I'll never get a Fields medal unless those ageist bastards increase the MaxAge >>> 40.
High on my list of why-bothers is a recent "translation" by the Australian Bible Society of the Bible into mobilephone text-speak format. This SMS Bible is ever-so-predictably unclever when u fnd @ da strt To save you hunting in your attic for the tattered remains At this rate I could exhaust you and the dictionary tracking overt and covert links. I'll leave it for now with the oft-quoted daddy of all cross-references: recursive adj. See recursive.
Thanks for the reader feedback on conflicting aphorism-pairs. I'll report the winners in my next column.
